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Objective: To survey members of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH; n = 327) and
of the Society for Medical Decision Making (SMDM; n = 77) to elicit the similarities and differences in their
reasoning about two clinical cases that involved ethical dilemmas.
Cases: Case 1 was that of a patient refusing treatment that a surgeon thought would be beneficial. Case 2
dealt with end-of-life care. The argument was whether intensive treatment should be continued of an
unconscious patient with multiorgan failure.
Method: Four questions, with structured multiple alternatives, were asked about each case: identified core
problems, needed additional information, appropriate next steps and who the decision maker should be.
Observations and results: Substantial similarities were noticed between the two groups in identifying the
core problems, the information needed and the appropriate next steps. SMDM members gave more
weight to outcomes and trade-offs and ASBH members had patient autonomy trump other considerations
more strongly. In case 1, more than 60% of ASBH respondents identified the patient alone as the decision
maker, whereas members of SMDM were almost evenly divided between having the patient as the solo
decision maker or preferring a group of some sort as the decision maker, a significant difference
(p,0.02). In case 2, both groups agreed that the question of discontinuing treatment should be discussed
with the family and that the family alone should not be the decision maker.
Conclusion: Despite distinctively different methods of case analysis and little communication between the
two professional communities, many similarities were observed in the actual decisions they reached on the
two clinical dilemmas.
S
ome clinical decisions are difficult for various reasons.
There may be a lack of evidence or conflicting evidence.
The choices may involve uncertainty about how possible
outcomes should be valued and by whom, or conflicting
values, such as prolonging life versus quality of life. The
outcomes may include a complex mix of benefits and harms,
so that the trade-offs are difficult to resolve, even if we are
clear about our own values. Such decisions may be
characterised as clinical dilemmas, for there are at least two
options in the choice set and it is not clear which is preferable
and according to which criteria.
Bioethicists and researchers in medical decision making
pursue investigations of the reasoning on difficult cases. Both
groups are concerned with the prescriptive and descriptive
study of decision making. In general, the medical decision-
making community uses utilitarianism as the normative
paradigm, aiming to maximise the overall good for most
people or for a single patient. Bioethicists use various
normative paradigms, including virtue ethics, utilitarianism,
ethics of care and deontology.1
Despite their common concerns, there is little communica-
tion between the medical decision-making community and
the bioethicists. We examined the citation lists of all articles
published in 2001 and 2002 in selected core journals in the
relevant fields—Health Economics; Medical Care; and Medical
Decision Making for medical decision making and Bioethics;
Hastings Center Report; Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics; and
Journal of Medical Ethics for bioethics. Out of hundreds of
citations, fewer than 10 from each group of journals were
found in papers published in the other, despite frequent calls
for more interdisciplinary cooperation between the social
sciences and bioethics.2–8
Differences between the fields may affect their conclusions
about specific clinical dilemmas:
1. Roots and vocabulary: The origins of clinical bioethics are in
philosophy, theology and the humanities,9 10 whereas the
foundations of medical decision making lie in economics,
psychology and decision theory.11–13
2. Key concepts: Some bioethicists typically consider the
rights, duties and obligations of the various parties. The
principle-based approach was dominant in the past
decades,1 but recently other approaches such as care-
ethics have become prominent.14 15 The medical decision-
making community considers clinical dilemmas by
systematically identifying the alternatives, and assessing
the probability and value of the outcomes in calculating
expected utility.
3. Methods of case analysis: The medical decision-making
community favours decision analysis to explore the
relevant issues.16 Trade-offs are to be made explicit and
preferably assessed quantitatively (calculated rational-
ity). For bioethicists, the analysis of issues is narrative
and qualitative, not mathematically formal and quanti-
tative.17
It is generally agreed that competent, well-informed adults
have the right to refuse treatment. The situation becomes
more problematic for health professionals when refusal can
lead to near-term serious harm. In this situation, a clinical
dilemma may arise, in the form of a conflict between the
Abbreviations: ASBH, American Society for Bioethics and Humanities;
ICU, intensive care unit; SMDM, Society for Medical Decision Making
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principles of respect for autonomy and beneficence.17 We use
one case to explore attitudes towards this dilemma.
Another dilemma may arise in end-of-life care around the
question of when it is appropriate to discontinue vigorous
treatment. Some recent studies have explored the attitudes of
health professionals and laypeople towards end-of-life care.
Investigators in France18 asked 221 laypeople and 189
professionals to judge the acceptability of euthanasia in 72
brief clinical scenarios in which levels of life expectancy,
patient’s request and family attitude varied systematically.
The attitudinal structure of both groups was similar. The
health professionals included doctors, nurses, psychologists
and nurses’ aides, and their attitudinal clusters were similar
to the lay group and across professions. A study using similar
methods19 explored factors affecting the acceptability of
relatively active (injecting a toxin) against relatively passive
(disconnecting life support), and voluntary against involun-
tary euthanasia among laypeople and health professionals,
including nurses’ aides, nurses and doctors. Again, lay and
professional responses were on the whole quite similar,
although nurses’ aides were closer to the lay group than were
the nurses. The sample of doctors was too small to permit
statistical comparisons with the other groups, and variation
within each professional group was not systematically related
to their ethical philosophy.
Some studies have explored attitudinal differences
between professional groups or as a function of clinical
experience. Solomon et al20 surveyed several hundred doctors
and nurses in five hospitals. The respondents were not asked
about their preferences or choices in specific cases, but were
asked to assess more general attitudes, such as whether they
believed that they had sometimes acted contrary to con-
science in providing care or whether the treatment offered
was more of a burden than a benefit to the patient. House
officers endorsed these statements more often than attending
doctors or nurses, whose attitudes were relatively similar,
suggesting a possible effect of experience. Again, differences
and similarities in ethical philosophy or outlook were not
dealt with in this study.
A search for studies that systematically explored differences
in the thinking of the bioethics and decision-making commu-
nities yielded only one study: Ubel et al21 investigated the
conflict between the principles of fairness and cost effectiveness
in public health decision making among members of the
American Association of Bioethics and of the Society for
Medical Decision Making (SMDM). Results showed that a
slight majority of bioethicists placed equity over cost effective-
ness, whereas a similar majority of the SMDM respondents
valued cost effectiveness over equity. The results may suggest
substantial similarity in the reasoning of the two groups,
notwithstanding the evident lack of scholarly communication
as reflected in the lack of cross-disciplinary citation. This result,
however, may apply specifically to public health dilemmas and
not to reasoning about clinical dilemmas.
To examine in more detail the similarities and differences
between the two communities with respect to clinical
dilemmas, we surveyed the membership of the American
Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) and the
SMDM. The aim was to describe their responses to two
clinical dilemmas. The choice of the cases and the informa-
tion we presented for each case were such that the resolution
of the dilemma was not obvious beforehand, so that the
responses to the cases could be sensitive to the theoretical
background of the respondent. We hypothesised that
decision makers would focus more on assessing the quality
of outcomes, using a utilitarian rationale. For ethicists we
had less clear-cut hypotheses, but expected both deontologi-
cal notions (eg, beneficence v patient autonomy) and care-
ethical principles to be reflected in the answers. Insights
obtained may facilitate communication between these groups
and increase the mutual understanding of and respect for
each other’s characteristic modes of thinking and deciding.
METHODS
Materials
The survey used two clinical dilemma cases, both actual cases
from the Leiden University Medical Center, Leiden, The
Netherlands. The first case is that of an elderly man with an
asymptomatic aortic aneurysm who prefers watchful waiting
to surgery despite the recommendation of his surgeon (see
appendix for case description). The second case is that of an
elderly man who develops multiorgan failure in the cardiac
care unit after major surgery. He is unconscious and has left
no living will or advance directive. The team at the intensive
care unit (ICU) and hospital administration favour disconti-
nuing active treatment, implying that the patient will be
moved from the ICU to make room for another. The patient’s
wife and children want to continue active treatment. The two
cases were chosen because they exemplify moral differences
regarding at least two points. Firstly, case 1 focuses at an
individual level on a conflict between respect for autonomy
and the doctor’s obligation to benefit the patient, whereas
case 2 embodies a conflict about social justice caused by
scarce resources and possibly influenced by futility argu-
ments. Secondly, case 1 deals with the issue to what degree a
professional should refrain from doing what he considers
beneficial, whereas case 2 embodies two conflicts: (a)
between family and professionals about whether to withdraw
treatment and (b) among professionals about allocation of a
scarce resource (as to which patient should get the ICU bed).
Case 2 thus deals with the question to what degree and for
what reasons professionals should consent to do something
that they consider wrong.
Four questions were asked about each case, each with
structured alternatives. The alternatives were developed from
a pilot study of the cases, conducted in an interdisciplinary
seminar at the Leiden University Medical Center. The
seminar, which discussed the two cases in one 3-h session,
was run as a focus group consisting of experts in medical
decision making and in bioethics. The alternatives were
developed from qualitative analysis of a verbatim transcript
of this discussion. The description of the cases is in the
appendix. The data tables have the alternatives.
The four questions were as follows:
1. Identify and rank the core problem(s) in the case
2. Rank the importance of potential additional information
3. Rank a set of potential appropriate actions
4. Identify the appropriate decision maker.
For the first three questions, respondents were asked to
rank as many of the alternatives as they thought were
appropriate. They could also add alternatives in a final open
question. The fourth question required a single choice from a
set of options that included the option ‘‘other’’.
The questionnaire was to be answered anonymously. The
institutional review boards at the University of Chicago at
Illinois, Illinois, USA, and the Leiden University Medical
Center, Leiden, The Netherlands, reviewed and approved the
study.
Participants
The survey was distributed to about 350 attendees at the
October 2001 meeting of SMDM. It was mailed in June 2002
to about 1500 members of ASBH, with a stamped envelope
addressed to one of the investigators. As the respondents
were guaranteed anonymity, follow-up of non-respondents
was not possible.
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Analysis plan
Ranks were reversed before analysis, so that 8 = high (for a
question with 8 alternatives). If for a particular question
respondents ranked some alternatives on the list and left the
others blank, we assumed the blank ones to be zeros and
included these in the analysis. If a respondent did not rank
any of the alternatives for a particular question, they were
considered to be missing. For questions 1–3, the medians of
each alternative were calculated for the two groups. The
distributions were typically non-normal, so differences in
location between the groups were assessed by the Mann–
Whitney tests. We also show the proportion of respondents in
each group assigning the highest two ranks (1 or 2 for the
unrecoded ranking) and test these proportions using x2 tests.
Significance was set at p = 0.01 because of multiple
comparisons. For the fourth question (Who should be the
decision maker?), many combinations of decision makers
were proposed and each drew too few respondents for a
meaningful analysis to be carried out. We collapsed the
response categories to two: for case 1, one for the patient
alone and the other for all combinations of responses,
including the patient and another person or group; for case




In all, 77 responses from SMDM and 327 from ASBH were
received (both response rates 22%). A few respondents did
not rank all questions, so there is some variation between
groups in the range of rankings. For each question (1–3), we
analysed those data that did not have missing values for that
particular question to allow for comparison among alter-
natives (listwise analysis).
Demographics
Respondents were asked to indicate if they were members of
SMDM or ASBH or both. No respondent was a member of
both societies. The highest earned degree was a doctorate
(MD, PhD or DSc) for 79% of ASBH respondents (36% MD,
40% PhD, 3% both) and for 85% of SMDM respondents (45%
MD, 33% PhD, 6% both). Differences were not statistically
significant.
Case 1
‘‘What is the core problem in this case?’’ Table 1 shows the
medians of the alternatives, as well as the proportion in each
group assigning the highest or second highest rank to each
alternative. The groups agreed that the two top-ranked core
problems are (1) the conflict between beneficence and
autonomy and (2) controversy about aims of care. The mean
rank assigned by ASBH members to the beneficence or
autonomy conflict was significantly higher (p = 0.008), as
was the proportion ranking this as 1 or 2. Further, a larger
proportion of SMDM members ranked the patient’s pre-
ference for short-term survival over long-term life expectancy
as most important (p = 0.001).
The second question identified the importance of addi-
tional information (table 2). The groups agreed that the most
important additional information would be about the
patient’s values and considerations. Beyond that, they
disagreed frequently. SMDM members next ranked the
effects on quality of life of both ruptured aneurysm and
surgery, whereas ASBH members next ranked the assessment








test p, x2 test
Patient’s preference for short-term survival over
long-term life expectancy
5 (41) 5 (23) NS 0.001
Patient is not sufficiently informed 0 (4) 0 (3) NS NS
Patient does not understand the information provided 0 (3) 0 (2) NS NS
Controversy about aims or objectives (life expectancy
versus quality of life)
7 (57) 7 (62) NS NS
Conflict between respect for patient’s autonomy and
rational choice
4.5 (18) 4 (20) NS NS
Conflict between surgeon’s wish to do good and
respect for patient’s autonomy
7 (53) 7 (71) 0.008 0.002
For the individual, statistics are irrelevant 0 (3) 0 (5) NS NS
ASBH, American Society for Bioethics and Humanities; SMDM, Society for Medical Decision Making.
Values in parentheses are proportions assigning the top two ranks.
NS, not significant.








test p, x2 test
Patient’s values and considerations 8 (68) 7 (72) NS NS
Both patient’s and surgeon’s values and considerations 2 (9) 4 (22) 0 0.006
Information on the decision-making process between the patient
and the surgeon
4 (11) 5 (28) 0 0.001
Assessment of the patient’s competence 5 (24) 6 (34) NS NS
Extent of the patients’ freedom to make his own decisions 4 (22) 5 (21) NS NS
Effects on quality of life of both ruptured aneurysm and surgery 6 (38) 4 (18) 0 0.00
Chances of surgical complications 5 (25) 3 (9) 0 0.00
ASBH, American Society for Bioethics and Humanities; SMDM, Society for Medical Decision Making.
Values in parentheses are proportions assigning the top two ranks.
NS, not significant.
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of patient’s competence. The ASBH group placed considerably
more emphasis on obtaining additional information on the
values of both the patient and the surgeon and the decision-
making process. The SMDM group ranked higher obtaining
information on the chances of surgical complications.
Table 3 shows the appropriate next steps to be considered.
Both groups ranked first exploring the considerations and
values of the patients to decide whether his decisions is
consistent with those values. They also agreed that it would
be worthwhile to try to convince the surgeon that not
maximising life expectancy may be a rational, competent
decision.
‘‘Who should be the decision maker in this case?’’ Of ASBH
respondents, 63% identified the patient alone as the decision
maker (see tables provided online at http://www.jmejour-
nals.com/supplemental), whereas for members of SMDM this
figure was 48% (x2 = 5.7, df = 1, p,0.02).
Case 2
‘‘What is the core problem in this case?’’ By wide margins,
the groups agree that the leading problems in this case are
that it is unclear what is best for the patient, and the view
that as further treatment is probably futile it would be
inappropriate to continue to treat vigorously (table 4). Only
15–20% in either group endorsed the alternative that the case
revolves around the conflict between individual and societal
perspectives or that treatment should continue as long as the
patient’s representative wants.
The two groups agreed that the most needed additional
information related to the preferences of the patient or his
family, and to his current and future quality of life (table 5).
The only significant difference was found for the ranking of
guidelines about futile treatment, which ASBH respondents
ranked marginally higher than SMDM (and not statistically
significant by x2). Nevertheless, the medians and proportion
ranking this as the top two were quite similar and the groups
shared concern about defining futile treatment as the basis
for recommending discontinuation of treatment.
Table 6 shows medians for the appropriate next step. The
two groups agreed on the top-ranked step, to explain to the
family that further treatment is futile and to seek their
consent to stop. There was also fair agreement that it was
appropriate to follow the family’s wishes (ranked second by
SMDM and third by ASBH, although a larger proportion of
SMDM members ranked this at the top). The groups
disagreed about three alternatives that concerned the weight
that should be given to the competing interests of the two
patients, one already in the ICU and the other waiting for a








test p, x2 test
Interrogate and understand the considerations and values
of the patient to decide whether his decision is consistent
with his considerations
8 (79) 8 (75) NS NS
Suggest patients should reconsider his choice (try to convince
with life expectancy information)
0 (8) 0 (8) NS NS
Accept the patient’s choice and explicitly approve it 0 (17) 0 (16) NS NS
Accept the patient’s choice even if you disagree with it, but
do not explicitly state this
3 (13) 4 (21) NS NS
Accept the patient’s choice but explicitly state that you disagree
with it
2 (18) 0 (16) NS NS
Re-evaluate the problem with the surgeon and patient 5 (22) 5 (23) NS NS
Try to convince the surgeon that not maximising life expectancy
may be a rational and competent decision (if the patient
understands all information)
6 (38) 6 (34) NS NS
ASBH, American Society for Bioethics and Humanities; SMDM, Society for Medical Decision Making.
Values in parentheses are proportions assigning the top two ranks.
NS, not significant.








test p, x2 test
Considering scarce resources, further vigorous treatment is
inappropriate
4 (8) 0 (8) NS NS
Considering that further treatment is very likely futile, further
vigorous treatment is inappropriate
8 (42) 8 (47) NS NS
Conflict between patient perspective and societal perspective 6 (21) 6 (16) NS NS
Lack of a hospital or governmental policy for allocating ICU beds 0 (8) 0 (6) NS NS
A patient in an ICU bed has a stronger moral right to treatment
than someone on a waiting list, regardless of health status
0 (1) 0 (3) NS NS
The patient (or his family) has a right to treatment, even if it is
likely to be ineffective
0 (8) 0 (7) NS NS
There is no problem. As long as treatment is not futile and the
patient (or his representative) wants it, treatment should continue
0 (16) 0 (20) NS NS
Conflict about withdrawing treatment. Is it letting the patient die
or killing him?
5 (15) 0 (45) NS NS
It is unclear what is best for the patient 9 (51) 8.5 (50) NS NS
ASBH, American Society for Bioethics and Humanities; ICU, intensive care unit; SMDM, Society for Medical
Decision Making.
Values in parentheses are proportions assigning the top two ranks.
NS, not significant.
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bed. The SMDM members assign more importance to
balancing the competing interests, whereas ASBH respon-
dents argue that only the interests of the patient in the ICU
bed are relevant to the decision. Half of ASBH, but less than a
quarter of SMDM members, agreed that patients should not
be compared (p,0.001). In this response, SMDM respon-
dents take a more utilitarian perspective, as hypothesised,
arguing that expected benefit is a legitimate criterion for
selecting who should be treated.
By wide margins, both groups agree that the family alone
should not be the decision maker (see tables provided online
at http://www.jmejournals.com/supplemental). In all, 80% of
SMDM members and 73% of ASBH members indicated that
the family and others, or others should make the decision.
Thus, they agree that although the question of discontinuing
treatment should be discussed with the family (potential
next steps), the family alone should not be the decision
maker.
DISCUSSION
Our inquiries were directed at determining similarities and
differences in how two quite distinct scholarly communities
reason about two dilemmas in clinical medicine. For this
reason we selected two cases, on the basis of expectations
regarding differences in approach between the two commu-
nities. We had seen such differences in the arguments raised
in the pilot study that was the basis of our survey
questionnaire. The first case was a conflict between respect
for autonomy and beneficence at an individual level, and the
second reflected a conflict of social justice caused by scarce
resources, possibly influenced by futility arguments.
One of our central theoretical presuppositions of this
survey was that the so-called facts of the clinical case do not
show inherently where or what the essential moral dilemmas
are. We expected that the theoretical background of the
different scholars would influence their perceptions of the
moral dilemmas (as well as their solutions to them). Our
hypothesis was that SMDM members, by training, are more
strongly focused on assessing the outcomes to decide what
the best decision would be. Underlying this view is the
general positivist assumption that on the basis of empirical
data we can know what the best decision is. This line of
thinking is clearly reflected in the answers to the question on
the additional information needed for case 1. SMDM
respondents assigned more importance to forecasting the
effects of alternative treatment strategies on the patient’s
quality of life and on estimating the chances of surgical
complications. This utilitarian line of thinking was also
present in the ASBH community, but deontologists and care-
ethicists were clearly present as well. Using a deontology or
rights–duties framework (eg, respect for autonomy and
autonomy should be ‘‘the’’ guiding principle), outcomes are
not the most relevant criteria for choice, as the ideal decision
can be determined beforehand, without knowing the possible
outcomes. Using a care-ethics framework, the caring rela-
tionship and the mutual responsibility for respecting that
relationship are central topics. In such a framework, the
criteria for the best decision are not clearly determined
beforehand, are process oriented and, especially, information
about values is important.
Our quantitative results did reflect to some extent what we
had expected, with SMDM members giving more weight to








test p, x2 test
Assessment of benefits between patients 3 (11) 0 (6) NS NS
Definition of futile medicine 6 (33) 6 (30) NS NS
Success rate at which an ICU bed would be cost effective 0 (0) 0 (1) NS NS
Guidelines on futility of treatment 5 (25) 6 (29) 0.01 NS
Patient’s (or family’s) preferences 7 (67) 7 (63) NS NS
Patient’s current and future quality of life 7 (61) 7 (64) NS NS
Assessment of resource scarcity 3 (3) 3 (5) NS NS
ASBH, American Society for Bioethics and Humanities; ICU, intensive care unit; SMDM, Society for Medical
Decision Making.
Values in parentheses are proportions assigning the top two ranks.
NS, not significant.








test p, x2 test
Weigh the interests of a patient in ICU bed and a patient on the
waiting list
3 (23) 0 (12) 0 0.01
Estimate the medical consequences of no treatment to both
patients and then decide whether to discharge one and admit
another
0 (16) 0 (13) 0 NS
Do not compare patients! Only medical arguments for this one
patient (in the ICU bed) are relevant
0 (22) 5 (49) 0 0.00
Offer treatment for even a small benefit (unless treatment is futile) 4 (19) 4 (21) NS NS
Explain to the patient’s family that further treatment is futile.
Seek their consent to stop
7 (69) 6 (61) NS NS
Follow family’s wishes 5 (36) 4 (22) NS 0.01
ASBH, American Society for Bioethics and Humanities; ICU, intensive care unit; SMDM, Society for Medical
Decision Making.
Values in parentheses are proportions assigning the top two ranks.
NS, not significant.
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the outcomes and the trade-offs, and ASBH members having
patient autonomy trump other considerations more strongly.
In both cases, however, we also found substantial similarities
between the two groups in identifying the core problems, the
information needed and the next steps that should be taken.
In case 1, as hypothesised, bioethicists often endorsed a
deontological conflict (beneficence v autonomy), whereas
decision makers often indicated that patient preferences
should have a role, which does not necessarily refer to an
ethical issue. Both groups agreed that additional information
about the patient’s values was needed. Beyond that, the
ASBH group emphasised more the conversation between the
patient and clinician, whereas for SMDM, as expected,
information on probabilities and outcomes of the alternative
strategies was more central. Thus, for the SMDM group, the
central issues revolve less around interaction and more
around prognostic considerations. Further, although ASBH
members ranked information on the patient’s values the
highest, substantial proportions of them also indicated that
information on values of both the patient and the surgeon
and on the decision-making process would be important. This
may reflect a recent trend within the discipline of bioethics,
by which the dominance of the principle of autonomy (or of
the paradigm of principles in general) has decreased, and
that alternative approaches such as care-ethics are emer-
ging.15 22 It may also point to the fact that bioethicists seem to
focus more on contextual elements of the case, rather than on
just applying moral principles to clinical cases (a change from
deductive approaches towards inductive approaches3 23).
In case 1, the patient could participate in decision making,
and most of the ASBH respondents favoured him as the sole
decision maker, whereas members of SMDM were more
evenly divided about whether other parties should participate
in the decision making. This difference reflects greater
emphasis by SMDM members on getting a favourable
outcome (increased chances of living) for the patient,
whereas ASBH members tend to give more weight to patient
autonomy. Both communities, however, agreed that the
patient’s wishes should outweigh the surgeon’s preferences.
In case 2, the groups agreed that the primary task is to
explain to the family that further treatment is futile and to
get the family to consent to discontinuing vigorous treat-
ment. As expected, SMDM members gave somewhat more
importance to balancing the competing interests of the two
patients, but they agreed that resource allocation was
secondary to considering the best interests of the patient in
the case. ASBH respondents argued that interests of only the
patient in the ICU bed are relevant to deciding whether to
continue treating him in the ICU. Both groups agreed that
the question of discontinuing treatment should be discussed
with the family, but the family alone should not be the
decision maker. The emphasis on patient autonomy that
appeared in case 1 (where the patient could be directly
involved in the decision) is moderated in case 2, where
surrogates are required, and neither group insisted that the
family was the sole legitimate surrogate, although this
position is regularly defended in the US. Both groups agreed
that the interests of the patient could be as fairly represented
by the clinical team as by the family, although the family
must surely be brought into the discussion.
The difference between the groups in identifying the
decision maker in case 1 is a fundamental issue. As SMDM
members are more inclined to determine the best treatment
by means of expertise and objective knowledge, more of them
see the decision as one that should be shared between the
patient and professional experts. Members of ASBH are more
focused on moral problems and moral agency, which
automatically leads to the agent (patient) himself.
No clear conclusion can be drawn regarding the moral
distinction between refraining from doing what we consider
right (case 1) and consenting to doing something we consider
wrong. For case 1, the two groups agreed about the two top-
ranked core problems, even though the mean rank by the
ASBH members for the beneficence–autonomy conflict was
higher. About the next step, both groups also agreed that
once the patients’ decision is understood to be in line with his
values, the surgeon should be convinced that not performing
surgery may be a rational option. Both groups thus seem to
perceive it as not a very strong dilemma. In case 2, even
though agreement existed regarding the core problem, much
more variation was seen regarding the next steps. This
distinction between the two cases is in line with the fact that
the right of a competent patient to refuse treatment,
especially a risky treatment (case 1), is well established in
both bioethics and medical decision making. Respect for
autonomy trumps the doctor’s obligation to benefit the
patient, especially in cases such as ours when the benefit is
uncertain owing to the risk of perioperative mortality. Still,
given the closed answering options, we cannot really assess
the effect of the different moral connotation of the two cases.
We acknowledge that the content of the questions did not
make it easy for respondents to communicate their reflec-
tions, if any, on this moral distinction.
This paper began with our observation that the two
communities we studied communicate very little with each
other. This impression is supported by the very composition
of our sample: none of the respondents was a member of
both SMDM and ASBH. The communities go to different
meetings, read different journals, espouse different theories,
use different concepts and different methods of case analysis.
Despite these differences, there are many similarities in the
actual decisions they reach in two clinical dilemmas. Why is
this so? Firstly, the sample of cases is quite limited, and there
may be cultural consensus on what is appropriate.
Particularly in case 1, consensus on patient autonomy may
trump all other theories.
Further, judging from the questionnaires, SMDM respon-
dents did not answer the questions by drawing decision trees.
Instead, they responded intuitively, as did ASBH respon-
dents. Both groups are highly educated experts and their
intuitions about these cases may be similar, shaped by their
experiences, education and social class. This would fit with
the work of Donald Schön,24 which describes how, by
reflecting on action, professionals enhance their learning
and add to their repertoire of experiences, from which they
can draw in future problem situations. Practitioners thus
reflect on and learn from experience with the aim of
encouraging the integration of theory and practice, which
may lead to changes in knowledge, attitudes and behaviour,
and which may lead to more similar actions in professionals
from different backgrounds than we would expect on the
basis of their professional training. Ethical theories empha-
sise different principles and sharp distinctions between
principles characterise different theories. But when we get
down to cases or to practice, clinical dilemmas have inherent
conflicts between at least two defensible, worthy principles.
Thus, in practice, members of SMDM look to more than
maximising expected utility, and bioethicists give some
weight to social consequences in practice even if they may
give utilitarianism little weight as a theoretical principle. The
quantitative nature of our questionnaire, with predefined
options, would further enhance such an effect, and make
respondents incorporate principles that by training were
perhaps not the first ones they would resort to.
This study has several limitations. Firstly, it deals with only
two cases. Differences between the two communities may be
more clearly delineated by other cases. If we had used more
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cases, however, the response rate would have been even
lower than it was. Secondly, to be practical, we limited the
scope of the inquiry to four questions and a multiple-choice
response format. Other questions or other modes of inquiry
(such as focus groups) may lead to identifying other
commitments and differences. The questionnaire was based
on such a qualitative investigation, however, with response
options reflecting the findings thereof. We wished to evaluate
the findings from this qualitative pilot in a larger sample.
Thirdly, information about the sex and religious beliefs of the
respondents was not collected, and these factors may have
important effects on reasoning in these cases. Finally, the
response rate was disappointingly low for both groups, and
we do not know how this may have biased the findings.
Possibly the low response rate inflated similarities between
the groups, as it may be expected that those who are
interested in the topic or sympathetic to our method were
more likely to respond, and those respondents may also be
more aware of the reasoning of the other group. If
respondents consisted of the more utilitarian thinkers among
ASBH members, this would result in answers more similar to
those of SMDM members.
In conclusion, it seems that the lack of communication
between the two groups is sustained more by disciplinary
boundaries and differences in methods of case analysis than
by fundamental disagreement about what should be done in
particular cases. At least in the two cases studied, there are no
fundamental disagreements about the appropriateness of
particular actions in specific cases, although there are
differences in emphasis—for example, about the desirable
extent of patient autonomy. We believe that the separation of
the communities is not morally and practically desirable, and
that both communities can profit from increased interdisci-
plinary dialogue and cooperation.
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APPENDIX
CASE 1
During the course of evaluation of an unrelated problem, an
asymptomatic abdominal dilatation of the aorta of 6.4 cm
(aneurysm) is found in a 76-year-old man. (Normally, the
aorta is about 3 cm.) He runs the risk that the aneurysm may
rupture which in turn may cause death within minutes.
Three possible strategies are identified:
a. Perform surgery as soon as possible to replace the
aneurysm with an artificial aorta.
b. Regular follow up the aneurysm to see if it has grown.
Discuss surgery with the patient if and when it becomes
further enlarged.
c. Do nothing, no surgery and no regular follow-up. Proceed
as if the aneurysm had not been found.
The patient is participating in a study on decision support
in cases of abdominal aortic aneurysm, and so receives a
brochure with individualised risk information calculated
from an evidence-based decision analytical model. The
brochure provides the following model-based statistical
information for both surgeon and patient.
Short-term risks
N Risk of rupture in the first year, 8% (75% of these will die)
N Risk of surgical mortality, 3%
The patient is a member of the Dutch Society for Free
Euthanasia. He strongly dislikes surgery because of the risk
of immediate death, the possible complications and the 2–6-
month recovery period after surgery (tired, less appetite). He
is married, happy with his life and prefers immediate death
caused by a rupture to the surgery-associated risks. In line
with these arguments, the patient’s choice is ‘‘do nothing’’.
The surgeon disagrees, but respects the patient’s decision.
The surgeon wonders if the patient would have chosen
surgery if he had not participated in the study on decision
support and had not received explicit information about risks
through the risk information brochure.
CASE 2
An 83-year-old man, previously in good health and very
active, develops a ruptured aortic aneurysm and undergoes a
major surgery to repair it. He is moved to a surgical intensive
care unit, where he develops multiorgan failure. He is put on
a ventilator and renal dialysis. Dopamine and adrenaline are
given to sustain his circulation at a reasonable level.
Gangrene develops in his right foot, so that amputation of
the foot (or even the lower leg) may be necessary in the
future. The patient is anaesthetised to prevent him from
pulling out the ventilator tube and is unable to participate in
any medical decision making. He has made no living will or
advance directive. His wife is emotionally distressed and
seems to have difficulty in understanding how critically ill he
is. The team of doctors believe that his wife is so emotionally
distressed that she does not seem reliable, stable or
trustworthy. Some members of the ICU team and the
hospital administration argue that active treatment should
be discontinued and only supportive treatment provided.
Others believe that vigorous efforts for this patient should
continue. Both parties of the argument provide reasons to
support their positions. The next patient is already waiting to
be admitted.
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